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Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law
School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is the only university-based applied
research center and forum dedicated to the study, practice and discussion of sustainable
international investment.
Its mission is to develop practical approaches for governments, investors, communities and
other stakeholders to maximize the benefits of international investment for sustainable
development.
Brooke Guven (Legal Researcher), Perrine Toldano (Head: Extractive Industries) and Lise
Johnson (Head: Investment Law and Policy) participated in the preparation of this report, and
would like to thank Jenny Loutit and Ella Merrill for their contributions. CCSI would also
like to acknowledge the significant contributions of several law firms.
**This report was prepared based on research conducted in 2016. Information contained in
this report may have been superseded.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By their very nature, extractive industry projects often carry with them a high risk of
environmental harm. Governments that host foreign investments in mining or oil and gas
projects, in particular, run the risk of such projects encountering environmental disasters or
imposing lasting, sometimes irreversible, harm on the environment. Despite the perceived
opportunities to accelerate national economic development that such investments bring hostgovernments, the fallout from extractive projects can in some cases outweigh the benefits if
host-governments fail to plan for and regulate the execution of these projects.
Nevertheless, host-governments seeking to mitigate the adverse consequences of existing
investments and impose greater environmental protections on new investments often face
investors that are unwilling to change their operations and update their practices. This Report
considers the steps that host-governments can take during each of the pre-investment phase,
the operation phase, and, if environmental damage does occur, the enforcement phase, to better
protect themselves against environmental disasters associated with private sector investments
(particularly those made by foreign investors where all or a large part of the assets of the
developer are not located within the host-country). In particular, the report emphasises the role
that planning and a robust legal and regulatory framework can have on decreasing the risk of
environmentally damaging events and on minimizing the fallout from investment-related
environmental disasters.
Using a comparative case study methodology, this report considers the approaches taken by
certain governments to domestic environmental legal frameworks and environmental
liabilities. We focus on Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Uganda and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
(collectively, the Case Study Countries), which cover Africa, the Middle East, North America,
South America and Asia, and represent a wide cross-section in terms of their degree of
economic and social development, scope and depth of foreign investment, dominant industries,
and strength of public institutions.
The authors set forth various key findings based on analysis of the Case Study Countries.
During the pre-development, negotiation phase:
•

Where there is a lack of applicable environmental legislation in a country, governments
should ensure that developers have contractual obligations to comply with best practice,
third party performance standards, international environmental law and/or foreign
legislation to ensure that developers are held to internationally recognized standards.

•

Host governments should ensure that developers are required to submit evidence that
they have the necessary technical experience and capability to execute the relevant
project as a condition to awarding the project or granting the applicable environmental
licence. With respect to projects where there is a significant risk of environmental
liabilities, governments should appoint independent technical advisers to assist
regulatory authorities in making this determination.
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•

Governments should carefully consider whether developers should be required to
provide a form (or forms) of financial security for their obligations. Financial security
may take the form of a parent company or other guarantee from a creditworthy entity
within the developer's group or third party security such as a performance bond or letter
of credit that is maintained throughout the operating period.

•

Governments should ensure that change of control and anti-assignment provisions are
included in environmental licences and applicable project documents so that the
government can ensure it has the ability to consent to or be notified of new developers
that may join the project.

With respect to Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA):
•

Governments should ensure that an adequate EIA is carried out by the developer as a
prerequisite to approving a proposed project or licensee. The EIA should be conducted
by a properly qualified, independent third party and should be submitted to and
evaluated by the relevant regulatory authority.

•

The regulatory authority should actively consult with other stakeholders, including the
local community, as part of the process of evaluating the developer’s EIA.

•

If the regulatory authority approves the relevant licensee or project subject to certain
conditions, then a contractual obligation to satisfy such conditions should be included
in the project documentation.

During the project operation phase:
•

Regulatory authorities must regularly follow up on EIA conditions to ensure that
obligations are carried out by developers and should continue to engage with wider
stakeholders to ensure the project continues to meet good environmental practices.

•

Governments should consider ring-fencing a part of any revenues, fees or tariffs
received from the development of the project in order to fund the monitoring activities
of regulatory authorities.

•

Governments should seek to provide training to regulatory bodies from third parties
such as the World Bank, multilateral agencies, or technical advisers to help advise
regulatory authorities about good industry practices, identify unsafe work practices, and
ways in which environmental damages can be reduced, mitigated, and/or removed.

During the post-disaster/enforcement phase:
•

The most critical issue identified in the review of the Case Study Countries, particularly
with respect to countries that are lower on the economic development scale, is a gap
between applicable environmental legislation and the enforcement of such
environmental legislation against developers that are in breach of the law.
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•

Financial penalties linked to environmental damage and breach of environmental laws
and regulations must act as a suitable deterrent. As such, the authors recommend that
the quantum of financial penalties have due regard to: (i) the nature of the breach and
the consequential socio-economic effect on the environment; and (ii) the amount of the
investment made by the developer of the project (such that penalties do not deter
smaller investment).

•

Environmental laws should seek to "pierce the corporate veil" to hold directors, officers
and other responsible persons accountable for breaches committed by the project
company. To the extent disclosure and ongoing updating of directors, officers, and other
responsible persons can be required by project documentation it may assist to ease
enforcement of these kinds of laws.

•

Governments may wish to consider establishing specialist environmental courts to
focus on environmental disputes in order to aggregate technical expertise and
streamline the judicial process.
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1

INTRODUCTION

By their very nature, extractive industry projects often carry with them a high risk of
environmental harm. Governments that host foreign investments, in particular mining or oil
and gas projects, run the risk of such projects encountering environmental disasters or imposing
lasting, sometimes irreversible, harm on the environment. Despite the perceived opportunities
to accelerate national economic development that such investments bring host-governments,
the fallout from extractive projects can in some cases outweigh the benefits if host-governments
fail to plan for and regulate the execution of these projects.
Nevertheless, host-governments seeking to mitigate the adverse consequences of existing
investments and impose greater environmental protections on new investments often face
investors that are unwilling to change their operations and update their practices. This Report
considers the steps that governments can take to protect themselves, and by extension the
environment and other stakeholder groups, against private sector investments (particularly
those made by foreign investors) that carry a risk of causing environmentally damaging events
and/or large-scale environmental disasters. In particular, it emphasises the role that planning
and a robust legal and regulatory framework can have on decreasing the risk of environmentally
damaging events and on minimizing the fallout from investment-related environmental
disasters.
Using a comparative case study methodology, this report considers the approaches taken by
certain governments with respect to domestic environmental legal frameworks and
environmental liabilities. We focus on Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Uganda and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) (collectively, the Case Study Countries). A summary of each Case Study
Country and its domestic environmental legal framework is set forth below. These countries
cover Africa, the Middle East, North America, South America and Asia, and represent a wide
cross-section in terms of their degree of economic and social development, scope and depth of
foreign investment, dominant industries, and strength of public institutions.
We selected Canada because of its relatively robust environmental legislation and strict
approach to environmental liabilities. For the purposes of this report, Canada generally serves
as a benchmark against which to compare and analyse the environmental regimes of the other
case-study countries.
Chile, Indonesia, Uganda and the UAE were selected to ensure a spectrum of geographic and
economic development. Each of these countries has large reserves of natural resources and a
history of investment by foreign investors in the extractive industries, namely: oil and gas
(UAE and Indonesia) and mining (Chile and Uganda).
There are three phases of the investment process during which governments can impose
environmental protections on extractive industry projects: at the planning or pre-development
phase, during the operational phase of the project, and, if environmental damage does occur,
during the enforcement phase. This report looks at the issues and best practices arising at each
of these phases and suggests some recommended safeguards that governments can implement
or impose on investors and projects to strengthen their environmental protection framework
and reduce the risk of environmental disasters and project-related environmental damage.
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Of the three phases, the planning/pre-development phase represents the greatest potential for
host-governments to minimize project-related environmental harm. This phase covers not only
the coordinated planning of the project with the investor but also the imposition of strong legal
and regulatory environmental frameworks that establish a system of environmental protection
obligations and review requirements. Nevertheless, given that extractive industry projects often
operate for many years, it is difficult to plan for all possible outcomes, and so it is also necessary
for governments and investors to work together during the operational phase of the project to
address potential adverse environmental consequences that may arise. In addition, governments
have so far been relatively reluctant to take action against investors whose investments cause
environmental damage in the host-state, and so there is room for governments to increase
environmental protections through improved enforcement measures. Finally, this report also
looks at the role that financial institutions can play in reducing the potential for environmental
harm caused by investor projects by imposing conditions on investors linked to the project’s
financing.
2

SUMMARY OF CASE STUDY COUNTRIES

Canada has a robust set of environmental laws and regulations at both federal and provincial
levels and a strong regulatory and compliance regime with a history of enforcement action
against developers that breach environmental standards. There is a high level of sophistication
in the procurement of projects and evaluation of potential developers and appropriate financial
security is provided for under Canadian law-governed project documents. The Government of
Canada has adopted a strict liability approach to environmental liabilities caused directly or
indirectly by developers and their officers and directors.
Chile has established itself as an economic leader in South America. Its national development
strategy has been built around its natural resources and in particular the mining sector where it
has attracted large-scale foreign investment from blue-chip corporate entities. Since the
government of Chile's ratification of the OECD Convention in 2010, Chile has strived to
implement best practices in terms of environmental protection and enforcement. As a result,
Chile is a good example of a country that has successfully attracted significant foreign
investment, while introducing reforms to increase monitoring and enforcement of its
environmental legislation.
The UAE has transformed its national economy by attracting investment in the oil and gas
sector. The UAE has a relatively advanced environmental regime (particularly in the oil and
gas sector) and has benefitted from being able to attract investment from major oil and gas
companies. Despite this, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the UAE has successfully
taken enforcement action against developers that have breached environmental law because of
the lack of any publicly available judgments of the UAE courts in this area.
Indonesia has attracted investment from the private sector in its oil and gas and mining
industries, but nonetheless faces significant environmental challenges as a result of its large
urbanised population, high demand for energy, and exploitation of its available natural
resources. Indonesia has a relatively coherent environmental legislative framework that is
principally based around command and control regulation requiring developers to carry out an
EIA in order to obtain environmental licences. Notwithstanding this, the authors understand
7

that in practice Indonesian regulatory authorities have not taken a hard-line approach to the
enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.
Uganda is actively encouraging foreign investment into the country including through the use
of tax incentives for foreign investors in the mining sector. The government of Uganda has
established a framework of environmental legislation that is broadly similar in scope to the
other Case Study Countries. However, we understand that there is a gap between the laws and
policies as enacted and the practice of implementing environmental conditions and enforcing
compliance.
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3

ISSUES AND BEST PRACTICES IN PROJECT PLANNING, MONITORING
AND ENFORCEMENT

When thinking about environmental protections and the life of an investment project, we can,
in broad terms, think of issues as arising in three phases: planning or pre-development (e.g.,
legislation and contracting), operational (e.g., monitoring and implementation of
environmental protections) and, if applicable, post-disaster (e.g., implementing mitigation
measures and enforcement of environmental protections). As will be discussed further below,
the planning or pre-development phase is in many ways the most critical phase as it is where
the parties plan and agree how the operational and enforcement phases will be carried out and
thus actions and measures taken at the planning phase have the potential to have the greatest
impact on the success of the project and on the ability of the government to mitigate any
eventual environmental harm. In general, many host-governments do already have in place
certain measures to plan for, prevent and even mitigate the financial, social, and environmental
impact of environmental disasters due to or in connection with private investments. Focusing
on the five Case Study Countries, this section will explore some of the primary measures and
protections that governments use to plan for and deal with environmental disasters and also
some of the key issues that arise at each project phase.
3.1 Phase 1: Pre-development and project planning phase
The pre-development and project planning phase is likely the most critical phase in the life of
an investment project as it sets the stage for the operational and enforcement phases of the
project as well as the nature of the relationship of the investment parties. This phase
encompasses both legislative and regulatory frameworks that host governments put in place
but also the negotiating and contracting phase with the developer. This section looks at the
ways in which the Case Study Countries have approached both the legislative and negotiating
aspects of the pre-development phase and highlights certain best practices or common practices
with respect to the Case Study Countries.
3.1.1

Environmental legislation

Each Case Study Country has a legislative framework in place that aims to manage the socioeconomic impact of investment in extractive and infrastructure industries. The level of detail,
complexity and overall robustness of these environmental laws varies by jurisdiction.1
Of the Case Study Countries, Canada has the most extensive set of environmental laws and the
strongest track record of enforcement. It is, however, notable that the other countries surveyed
in this Report have similar legislation and general legislative requirements in place relating to
the approval of projects, licensing regimes and monitoring requirements. For example, each
of the Case Study Countries requires developers to carry out an environmental impact

1

Some developing jurisdictions (outside of the Case Study Countries) may have very limited
environmental legislation where for example: (i) the economy of the jurisdiction is not reliant
on or has undeveloped natural resources; (ii) the jurisdiction has been recently recognized as a
sovereign state (e.g. Timor-Leste and South Sudan); or (iii) the jurisdiction is self-autonomous
but has not been recognised by the international community (e.g. Somaliland).
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assessment (EIA) as a pre-condition to the award of a project and/or the grant of an
environmental licence.
With that being said, the most significant difference between the Case Study Countries is the
gap between the applicable environmental legislation, which is broadly similar, and the
implementation and enforcement of these measures.
Nonetheless, countries that do not vigorously enforce their environmental laws and regulations
may still see investors uphold a certain level of environmentally sound practices in cases when:
•

international investors are subject to stringent environmental requirements in their
home jurisdictions when those requirements apply to or impact extraterritorial
investments and/or

•

international investors are required to follow stronger environmental requirements by
their lenders (or other parties with a financial interest in the project), in particular where
international financial institutions or export credit agencies are involved in the
financing of projects, when those institutions require strong environmental
requirements to be inserted into the applicable transaction documentation, and when
monitoring by such institutions occurs throughout the project.

In general, having a robust environmental legislative and regulatory framework is considered
best practice on the part of the host government because it creates a framework from the outset
within which the investor must operate and comply and thus reduces the risk of environmental
disasters during operation. Leaving the environmental protections to be incorporated on a caseby-case basis in the investment contract leads to inconsistent environmental protection and
makes important environmental protection obligations and requirements a negotiated term in
investment documentation. Box 1 below includes further discussion on the advantages and
disadvantages of legislative and contractual protections.
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Box 1: Legislative vs Contractual Protections
Environmental protections from foreign investment are generally found in two forms:
legislative protections, which are automatically applicable upon investment in a given
jurisdiction; and contractual protections, which are intentionally integrated into project
documents on a case-by-case basis and applicable only pursuant to the contractual terms.
In countries with weak environmental legislative protections, contractually importing, either
by reference or in more detailed format, more robust international (see, for example, Schedule
1 [Key international environmental instruments]) or third-country standards can provide a
higher degree of environmental protection and/or investor responsibility than the host country
is otherwise able to require based solely on its domestic legislation. However, relying on
contractual, rather than legislative, methods to establish environmental protections and
standards creates inconsistency in approach and makes it more difficult (and likely, more
costly from a financial perspective) for the host government to monitor and enforce the
environmental protections once the project is underway. Furthermore, it may also decrease the
chance that environmental protections will be incorporated or that any such protections will
be sufficiently effective because host government’s will be required to negotiate for them
(rather than have them automatically applicable in legislative form) and this runs the risk that
they may be negotiated away in favor of other project features.
Although
legislation
is likely
more effective
approach,
utility will ultimately depend on the
3.1.2
Corporate
structure
forthe
investments:
Suitability
of its
developers
extent to which such legislative protections are enforced.

Each Case Study Country has in its laws and regulations a mechanism for assessing the
suitability of a potential developer, by reference to the developer's technical competence and
available financial resources. However, it is not clear how rigorously or with what weight these
national legal assessments and requirements are applied in practice when countries are
considering proposed investments.
With respect to investments in each Case Study Country it is common practice for developers
to incorporate companies as “special purpose vehicles” (SPV) that will legally “hold” the
project-level investment. The SPV assets and liabilities will thus be legally remote from the
assets and liabilities of the developer, including both the parent company as well as from any
other investment projects of the developer. As such, if an environmental disaster occurs at the
project level, there remains a risk that the SPV entity may not have sufficient technical
experience and financial resources to manage or compensate the host country or other impacted
stakeholders for the damage.
The Case Study Countries take different approaches in their project specific documents to
reflect the perceived level of risk relating to the performance, or non-performance, as the case
may be, by the developer of its obligations. For example, Abu Dhabi’s oil and gas concession
agreements require each developer to provide a parent company guarantee in relation to its
subsidiary's obligations, whereas, similar oil and gas concession agreements in Indonesia do
not include this requirement.
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It is notable, however, that UAE law requires project companies incorporated in "onshore"
UAE SPVs to be majority owned by UAE entities, which may include ownership by
government authorities or state-owned companies. Where a government authority has a direct
interest in the SPV entity, the government is able to exercise considerably more control and
oversight over the actions and inactions of the SPV and the project.
Ultimately a country’s assessment of a developer's suitability to develop a project and the
reflection of any risk associated with the developer, including any applicable SPV, in the
project documents may also be influenced by:
•

market forces, i.e. is the government able to attract significant interest from suitable
developers?

•

the government’s relative bargaining power, i.e. is the government able to dictate terms
to the developer?

•

political pressure and local interests, i.e. is the government under pressure to procure
and complete the relevant project within a particular timeframe?

•

planning for decommissioning.

Not all of the Case Study Countries, in particular the UAE and Uganda, have a comprehensive
policy and process for decommissioning and do not routinely have funds or financial
safeguards in place to cover future liabilities for decommissioning. In addition, with respect to
offshore installations (particularly relevant for oil and gas projects), although there are a
number of treaties and other international instruments covering the decommissioning of
offshore installations, the requirements of these instruments vary considerably and not all Case
Study Countries are party to the instruments, as discussed further in Box 2 below.
In Chile, specifically with respect to mining projects, the Chilean Mining Law sets forth
specific decommissioning requirements which, among other obligations, require financial
guarantees to cover decommissioning expenses. The funds will only be released upon receipt
of a "Final Closing Certificate" issued by the Department of Geology and Mining certifying
that the project has been closed and all required measures have been implemented according
to the mine closure plan.
In Indonesia, oil and gas companies are required by the government to pay into an escrow
account to fund abandonment and decommissioning costs. Similarly, mining companies
operating in Indonesia are required to either provide a bank guarantee or pay into an escrow
account to cover reclamation costs for the environmental damage caused to the land.
In the UAE, the Federal Environment Law (FEL) does not include express provisions regarding
decommissioning.
There are, however, regulations at an emirate level regarding
decommissioning which include, for example, in Abu Dhabi, preparation of a
decommissioning plan setting out remediation, site control, and monitoring activities, but the
FEL does not include express obligations in relation to financial security for decommissioning
obligations.
12

Uganda lacks a comprehensive policy regarding decommissioning. Only the PEDP Act
provides for a decommissioning plan to be submitted to the Ugandan petroleum authority,
which must be done prior to the project company receiving a production licence or specific
licence to install and operate the project.
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Box 2: Decommissioning of Offshore Installations: International Legal Obligations
There are a number of treaties, conventions and instruments concerning the
decommissioning of offshore installations. These set out primarily the rules to protect
against the environmental implications of offshore installations and in particular their
abandonment or decommissioning, including liability therefor; however, they do not
generally address issues of financial security related to abandonment and decommissioning.
The principal international and regional legal instruments and guidelines are summarised in
Schedule 2.
As a general matter, international treaties, conventions and instruments are inconsistent in
their terms, some requiring complete removal of installations, others requiring partial
removal, subject to certain requirements being met (for example, preservation of safety and
navigation, protection from pollution and safeguarding marine and fisheries resources). Not
all of the Case Study Countries are a party to all or even some of these instruments even
when they may be particularly relevant. For example, as a coastal state, the UAE is neither
a party to Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf nor UNCLOS.
Nonetheless, it is generally accepted that a number of provisions of UNCLOS form
customary international law. In the context of decommissioning, article 60 of UNCLOS
provides that any installations or structures that are abandoned or disused must be removed
to ensure safety of navigation, taking into account any generally accepted international
standards established in this regard by the competent international organisation, and that
such removal must also have due regard to fishing, protection of the marine environment,
and the rights and duties of the other states. The competent international organisation is the
International Maritime Organization, which has introduced guidelines based on UNCLOS,
details of which are set out in in Schedule 2. Subject to certain requirements these guidelines
do not require complete removal of installations, although as of January 1998 any
installations must be designed and built so that their entire removal is feasible. While the
guidelines are by their nature not binding on states' parties, they do represent accepted
international practice.
For example, with respect to the UAE oil and gas sector, there is a lack of a tailored
legislative and regulatory framework for decommissioning. As a matter of international
law, the UAE is bound by its treaty obligations under the Kuwait Protocol, the Kuwait
Convention and the London Convention, and as discussed above, UNCLOS to the extent it
forms customary international law. The Abu Dhabi Petroleum Conservation Law includes
limited obligations in relation to abandonment and decommissioning. Critically, however,
issues regarding who has decommissioning liability and, based on such liability, how the
financial burden for abandonment and decommissioning will be secured, are unclear and
need to be addressed.
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3.2 Phase 2: Operational monitoring
Although each of the Case Study Countries has established regulatory bodies which are
responsible for monitoring developers to ensure that they comply with environmental
legislation and good practices (see Table 1 below [Regulatory Bodies of the Case Study
Countries]), it is unclear the extent to which the regulatory bodies (particularly in financiallyconstrained lower income countries) in practice oversee the implementation of environmental
safeguards and assess and monitor environmental conditions during the life of applicable
projects.
For example, in Uganda, although applicable environmental legislation provides for continuous
project monitoring, we understand that the regulatory authority has a shortage of manpower,
funding, training and technical expertise, which has led to delays in monitoring compliance
with EIA conditions and, when monitoring has been carried out, to sub-optimal levels.

Table 1: Environmental Regulatory Bodies in the Case Study Countries
Case Study Country

Environmental Regulatory Body

Canada

Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC)

Chile

Superintendence of the Environment (Superintendencia del
Medio Ambiente de Chile (SMA))

UAE

Environment Agency-Abu Dhabi (EAD)

Indonesia

Ministry for Environment and Forestry and applicable local
AMDAL Evaluation Commission

Uganda

National Environment Management Authority (NEMA)

There appears a strong need to strengthen regulatory bodies in developing countries through
the provision of adequate financial resources, human resources (both in terms of manpower
and training) and technical support.
3.3 Phase 3: Post-disaster and enforcement
Based on the Case Study Countries, set forth below are key findings relating to the ability of
governments to deal with a post-disaster scenario including the enforcement rights available to
governments against developers that have breached environmental laws.
3.3.1

Government approaches to enforcement

Each of the Case Study Countries has enacted legislation that allows the relevant government
to bring an action against developers which have breached applicable environmental law.
15

In practice, however, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws and regulations
may in some cases be lacking. One example of this outside of the Case Study Countries is
Nigeria, where there has been considerable environmental damage to the Niger Delta as a result
of oil spillages from operations conducted by international developers, but relatively few cases
of enforcement against such international developers despite the existence of applicable
environmental laws.
The failure to implement and enforce environmental laws in developing countries in
particular may be attributed to a number of factors including:
•

Budgetary constraints and inadequate financial and administrative resources being
available to regulators and industry institutions

•

A lack of political will (for various reasons) by a government to enforce its laws;

•

An overreliance on permissive environmental legal regimes which permit developers
to proceed with a project subject to completion of an EIA or obtaining an
environmental license, to the detriment of enforcement and deterrent measures; and

•

A desire to meet politically-driven project deadlines.

3.3.2

Capacity of governments to deal with environmental disasters

Lower-income Case Study Countries are, as a general matter, less well-prepared to deal with
the consequences of environmental disasters as a result of more limited financial resources, a
lack of technical experience and expertise, and/or a failure to efficiently coordinate responses
from regulatory authorities.
In contrast, Canada, in particular, has a demonstrated capacity and ability to respond swiftly
and effectively to environmental disasters. Furthermore, in an effort to assess the origins of the
disaster, Canada has also ordered independent reports after an environmental event in order to
investigate its causes and to suggest ways in which it could have been prevented.
3.3.3

Scope of environmental liability and appropriateness of enforcement rights

We have set out a summary of the Case Study Countries enforcement rights below in Table 2:
Table 2: Enforcement
Financial
penalties
Canada

Prison
sentence

Compliance orders/ Other powers
specific performance

Criminal and
civil financial
penalties
apply.
Penalties
increased

A breach of
environmenta
l legislation
may lead to
imprisonment
are .
for
16

Inspectors may issue
orders to stop an illegal
act or require the
developer to carry out
a particular action.

Search
and
seizure powers.
Entry into land
without warrant.

recalcitrant
offences.

Collection
samples
inspections.

Liability may
attach
to
officers,
directors,
employees and
agents
as
"responsible
persons".

of
and

Chile

Financial
penalties
apply, and are
adjusted based
on the size of
the
initial
investment and
seriousness of
the offences.

There is no
general
provision for
criminal
environmenta
l felonies in
Chile.

Environmental courts
may issue compliance
orders and decrees to
require
compliance
with
environmental
laws.

Indonesia

Criminal and
civil financial
penalties
apply.

The Indonesian courts Individuals
or
may make an order for groups
of
specific performance. individuals may
bring class-action
lawsuits against
developers.

Uganda

Criminal and
civil financial
penalties apply
to
both
individuals and
corporate
bodies.

There is no
general
provision for
imprisonment
but criminal
sanctions
may apply.
Breach
of
environmenta
l legislation
may lead to
imprisonment
.

UAE

Potential
substantial
fines: ranging
from
AED1,000 (c.
USD272) to
AED10
million
(c.
USD2,721,088

A breach of
environmenta
l legislation
may lead to
imprisonment
,
including
life

For
nuclear
damage, penalty
may include the
death penalty.
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NEMA has the power
to issue environmental
restoration orders for a
project company to
make
good
any
damage caused to the
environment.
Requirement under the
environmental laws to
pay all the costs of
treatment or removal
of
environmental
damage and the costs
of rehabilitation.

Individual
citizens can bring
claims against the
Superintendent of
the Environment
in respect of any
perceived
violation
of
environmental
rights by a project.

NEMA has the
power to cancel a
certificate
of
approval for a
project.

), depending imprisonment
on the nature .
of
the
violation.
3.3.4

Financial penalties

Each of the Case Study Countries allows regulatory authorities to impose financial penalties
on developers that are in breach of applicable environmental laws; however, the effectiveness
of these penalties varies between the Case Study Countries.
On one end of the spectrum, the financial penalties set out in Uganda's environmental
legislation are not particularly onerous for foreign investors, particularly developers from
countries with more developed economies and/or strong currencies, as the fines range from
approximately US$558 to US$5,583,438 (the latter being a one-off fine under the PEDP Act
for failure to obtain a licence). As such, even where such financial penalties are rigorously
enforced, to the extent that they are not sufficiently large these penalties may not be an effective
deterrent for international investors.
In contrast, the environmental law in Chile considers the financial resources of the developer
in determining the appropriate penalty for breaching the environmental law. This sliding-scale
approach offers two advantages:
(A) by allowing regulators to impost proportionately large fines, developers with
extensive financial resources and assets could still potentially be deterred from
breaching applicable environmental law as the amount of the fines will be significant
and scaled to the financial resources of the developer and not merely to the cost of
doing business in the host country; and
(B) the range of fines does not necessarily deter desirable investment by smaller
companies or in smaller projects, because the risk is proportionate to the size of the
investment.
Notwithstanding this progressive approach to financial penalties, its effectiveness may be
somewhat undermined by certain enforcement approaches, including that Chilean courts have
been willing to grant significant discounts on fines in exchange for prompt payment by the
developer.
3.3.5

Scope of liability

Each of the Case Study Countries holds developers directly liable for breaches of
environmental law; however, the extent to which this liability also extends to individual
directors, officers and other connected persons may differ in practice between the Case Study
Countries.
In Canada, liability under environmental legislation extends to any "responsible person",
including any officer, director or agent of the corporation who directed, authorised, assented
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to, acquiesced or participated in the commission of the offence. The concept of a "responsible
person" may also extend to shareholders, lenders, and other parties, provided that they can be
shown to have shaped the actions of the corporation in the commission of the offence. This
very deliberate approach of piercing the corporate veil can be contrasted with the
environmental law in Uganda, which in theory holds individuals and corporate bodies
responsible for breaches of environmental law but it is unclear whether in practice liability
would actually extend to an officer, director or agent of a corporate body.
In the majority of the Case Study Countries the state has the burden of proof to demonstrate
the requisite level of obligation for environmental contamination. Interestingly, Chile’s burden
is reversed such that the developer, when accused of breaching environmental obligations, is
required to prove that it did not negligently or maliciously cause or contribute to the
environmental contamination.
3.3.6

Environmental courts

A notable recent development in Chile has been the establishment of specialised environmental
courts to focus on resolving environmental disputes. Creating specific environmental courts
allows for an aggregation of technical expertise, a forum that can avoid judicial backlog, and
streamlining of cases. It is furthermore a strong signal of a host country's commitment to
environmental protection. Chile has successfully prosecuted a number of major mining
companies for environmental legal violations since the courts were instituted.
3.3.7

Damages

In common law jurisdictions the scope of an award for damages as a result of environmental
damage may be greater than in civil law jurisdictions because of the way in which common
law judges determine loss.
4

RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS

The Case Study Countries included in this Report cover Africa, the Middle East, North
America, South America and Asia, and represent a wide cross-section in terms of the degree
of economic and social development, scope and depth of foreign investment, dominant
industries and strength of institutions. Extrapolating these five countries to a global discussion
of diversity and functionality, there is no 'one size fits all' list of safeguards that will work with
respect to the nature of foreign investment in every, or any one, jurisdiction. However, by
comparing a variety of strategies across different country contexts, this Report aims to provide
context and background to various approaches thus providing a reference for strategies that can
be tailored to a particular circumstance.
Set out below is a summary list of various types of safeguards used in connection with major
projects, along with corresponding analysis regarding their strengths, weaknesses, and
contextual applicability.
4.1 Recommendations relating to the pre-development and planning phase
4.1.1

EIAs (or ESIAs)
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Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are used as a mechanism to 'pre-vet' a project from
an environmental perspective at the pre-development stage, before the relevant government
authority gives its consent for the project to proceed.
EIAs provide a significant opportunity for the host country to determine the potential
environmental (and, with respect to Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs),
social) impacts of a project and to set out any conditions upon which the project will be
permitted to proceed, which may include on-going monitoring and compliance requirements,
financial security, and disaster response plans.
Each of the Case Study Countries requires developers to carry out an EIA as a prerequisite to
the development of a project. However, as opposed to the applicable frameworks in Canada
and Chile, which have more robust mechanisms for the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of
EIA requirements, the three other Case Study Countries (Uganda, the UAE and Indonesia),
appear to emphasize to a greater degree initial regulatory approval of the projects and to a lesser
degree the ongoing obligations that may be required by the developer. As such, while
applicable legislation in these latter countries typically provides for on on-going monitoring
and evaluation of projects, we understand that in practice the ongoing EIA-related requirements
are often given much less weight than the initial EIA approval at the project inception.
Furthermore, the EIA process in some Case Study Countries is not immune to misaligned
incentive structures. For example, in Uganda, project companies are required to hire their own
private consultants to conduct an EIA (as opposed to choosing from a government-approved
list, in consultation with the government, hiring a consultant of the government’s choosing, or
the government hiring the consultant). As such, the private consultant may be incentivised to
represent the interests of the company that hired it and, by extension, to produce less objective
results. Ideally all EIAs will be conducted by independent and unbiased experts. To the extent
a host government does not have strong institutions and/or sufficient resources to ensure that
the EIA is conducted with such impartiality, such host countries may therefore seek to ensure
that at a minimum, consultants are subject to standards of professional liability and are required
to maintain professional liability insurance.
4.1.2

Assessment of developer's experience and technical capability

It is important that governments assess the suitability of developers for major projects by
reference to the developer's relevant experience and technical capability. Although it may not
always be possible to prevent environmental disasters from occurring, the appointment of an
experienced and technically capable developer will limit the risk of potential environmental
disasters occurring and such a developer will be better placed to mitigate the effects of the
environmental damage when compared to a developer with little or no experience and/or
technical capability.
An assessment of technical competence may, for example, require developers to submit
evidence that:
•

the developer has successfully executed other “similar” projects by reference to factors
such as: the size, complexity, and geographic location of the project;
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•

the developer’s proposed technology is “proven” within the industry;

•

the developer is and has been able to successfully attract finance for its projects; and

•

there are no existing environmental liabilities or claims affecting any of the developer’s
other projects and the developer has a strong environmental track record in all other
jurisdictions.

Where possible, governments should appoint technical advisers (i.e. international and
recognized engineering consulting companies) to assist government entities in assessing and
evaluating the technical competence of developers.
4.1.3

Assessment of developer's financial capacity

At the same time as carrying out an assessment of a developer's technical capability,
governments should evaluate whether the contracting entity will have sufficient financial
means to meet its contractual obligations and to address any potential environmental liabilities
during the entire project life-cycle.
One of the most important considerations for government entities is the identity of the
developer entity that will enter into the project agreements. Governments should ensure that
they are contracting with a creditworthy entity which is both able to discharge its obligations
under the relevant project agreements and able to meet any potential liabilities that may occur
during the term of the project, for example as a result of an environmental disaster.
For their part, foreign developers looking to enter an overseas jurisdiction will have various
considerations. They will typically look to ensure that:
•

profits made from operations in the relevant overseas jurisdiction may be freely
repatriated to the developer's holding company or parent company;

•

the corporate structure of the developer's investment is structured in such a way as to
reduce the company's overall tax liability and benefit from investment treaty
protections; and

•

the choice of corporate structure is compliant with the local companies law or law on
foreign investment; for example, UAE law requires developers to establish a local entity
where the project is to be situated in 'onshore' UAE.

As a result of the considerations above, such developers will typically seek to establish a local
SPV entity to act as the contracting entity with host government entities. Developers may also
prefer to establish an SPV company where they are looking to raise project finance or similar
limited-recourse debt funding (see “Corporate vs Project Finance” below).
In many cases, particularly when a SPV-based, project-finance structure is used, the
creditworthiness of the developer’s corporate family may not be applicable to the project-level
financing and project investment. There is a resulting tension between, on the one hand, a
government's preference for contracting with substantial creditworthy corporate entities, which
by definition will include a larger portion of the corporate family beyond simply the SPV, and,
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on the other hand, a developer's preference for contracting with local SPV entities. Careful
attention should therefore be given to the financial picture of the particular entity within the
context of the project agreements (which may include guarantees, bonds or other sources of
revenue in some cases).
Governments should therefore carefully consider whether to request developers to provide
security in the form of:
•

an up- or cross-stream guarantee from within the corporate family in relation to the
performance by the developer’s subsidiary of its obligations;

•

a letter of credit, performance bond, or payment into an escrow account, to address any
particular issues of concern for the government, for example to fund the cost of
decommissioning the project facilities at the end of the concession term; and/or

•

insurance to address the risk of unanticipated disasters. Outside of political risk
insurance, which is available through public agencies (see “Export Credit Agencies”
below), insurance to address environmental risks may be available through the private
sector. Some countries may require specific domestic licensing/registration
requirements of insurers (although in combination with reinsurance, an agency from a
larger market may become involved). The scope of insurance may be capped and
limited (e.g. does not include wilful misconduct) and pricing of insurance will depend
on the particular transaction and risk profile of the project.

While companies may be reluctant to issue up- or cross-stream guarantees because of, among
other reasons, disclosure requirements, up- or cross-stream company guarantees, in addition to
providing other financial security for the host-government, have other benefits resulting from
the additional diligence given to the project within the corporate family of the developer. This
is because the internal corporate processes required to grant an up- or cross-stream guarantee
will frequently mean that the project is scrutinized at higher levels of the corporate structure
than it otherwise may be absent a guarantee requirement. This additional scrutiny can result in
greater diligence and risk consideration of the project as a whole, which can have a beneficial
impact on environmental controls when;
•

the nature of the project is considered to be ‘high risk’, for example, whether there is a
potential risk of large environmental liabilities;

•

the developer is able to demonstrate that it has successfully completed similar projects
and has the technical experience and know-how to execute the new project; and

•

the developer is a subsidiary of a high-profiel listed corporate entity with considerable
resources and stakeholder engagement

Setting aside the monetary value of the guarantee, the certainty on the part of a government of
recourse to a more creditworthy entity and the incentive for developers to avoid reputational
damage to the group that may arise with an environmental disaster, may themselves be
sufficiently useful in practice to avoid the need for enforcement through the courts or dispute
resolution.
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4.1.4

Change of control

In order to ensure that governments retain the benefit of a developer's technical experience and
financial resources through the entire life-cycle of a project, we recommend that governments
include change of control and anti-assignment provisions in environmental licences and project
documents as well as in applicable law.
Change of control and anti-assignment provisions allow governments to assess whether, as a
result of a change of corporate control or assignment of the project, there has been a material
change in relation to the originally contracted developer's ability to perform its obligations
under an environmental licence or project document and, if so, to cancel or terminate the project
licence or agreement. These kinds of contractual provisions are important protections in
practice to prevent companies with a poor environmental track record from becoming licensees
through the acquisition of other companies or other means, and for the government to ensure
that it retains some level of control over the entity that is managing an environmentally
sensitive project.
4.1.5

Contractual protections: Incorporation of third party performance standards or foreign
legislation into project documents

Unlike most developed countries, some developing countries may not have a robust set of
environmental laws and regulations that:
•

Require developers to act in accordance with standards that are consistent with “good
industry practice”; or

•

Set out an effective environmental liability regime

One solution that we recommend to address a comparative lack of environmental legislation
would be to ensure that developers have contractual obligations in project documents to comply
with:
•

“good industry practice”, which should be defined in further detail or confirmed by a
technical adviser appointed to advise the relevant governments;

•

third party performance standards that promote best practices, such as the IFC's
Performance Standards or other environmental guidelines which are produced by ECAs
such as JBIC or NEXI; and/or

•

the laws and/or regulations of a jurisdiction with more robust environmental
protections, as if they were directly applicable in the host country.

A breach by a developer of any of these contractual obligations may ultimately result in an
event of default (if not remedied by the developer) pursuant to the terms of the project
documents, which among other rights given to the government, may allow the government
entity to terminate the relevant project document(s).
The authors are aware of a number of projects in which governments and financial institutions
have required developers to apply a higher standard of performance to their obligations than
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may be required under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the project is situated. As an
example, a major public-private partnership (PPP) project in the Middle East contractually
incorporates specific European environmental legislation into its terms because of the lack of
domestic environmental legislation that is specialized to the particular project.
A significant development over the last ten years has been the increased involvement of ECAs
and MLAs in setting certain social and environmental performance standards that developers
are required to meet in order to obtain financing for projects. As such, governments may
benefit from the relevant negotiating positions of these institutions and their environmental
requirements for a project. The role that financial institutions can and do play in project
planning and monitoring is further discussed below.
4.1.6

Stakeholder engagement

Many claims brought against private companies and/or governments of developing countries
related to the impacts of environmental damage have been brought by individuals or groups of
individuals within a project-affected community.
Governments should require meaningful stakeholder engagement, which at a minimum should
be to the extent required by international and domestic laws and norms, with affected
communities at the EIA stage of the project and that stakeholders continue to be consulted as
part of the on-going monitoring process.
4.1.7

Decommissioning

In general countries, and developing countries in particular, should place greater emphasis at
the inception of a project on requiring provisions that will address decommissioning and
reclamation costs, thereby considering the lifecycle of the project and not merely short-term
project revenues. A more holistic and proactive approach will better address the financial and
environmental risks that are presented by early decommissioning or abandonment of an
extractives project. Comprehensive procedures should be put in place, including requirements
for decommissioning and abandonment plans. It is also critical that there is a mechanism
provided for assessing future costs and that adequate financial security be provided as a
prerequisite to project inception.
4.1.8

Climate Change and Project Development

Climate change impacts on development will differ from country to country. However, it is
clear that without proactive measures and the establishment of safeguards, climate change is
likely to have a significant negative impact on future developments. Each of the Case Study
Countries is a party to the climate change conventions, including the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement.
At a domestic level in accordance with the UNFCCC, each of the Case Study Countries other
than Canada is a Non-Annex 1 country and therefore is not obligated to reduce its emissions.
Nonetheless, all the Case Study Countries have the ability, particularly when considering
preconditions to foreign investment in their countries, to develop regulations and policies to
achieve emissions reductions, depending on their capacity to realise sustainability.
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Climate change is currently not typically addressed as a separate risk event in project
documents; however, climate change is being directly and indirectly addressed in projects
through the following means:
•

the enactment of new legislation by governments and ratification of international
conventions, such as the Paris Agreement;

•

sustainable development policies of governments, such as the UAE's goal to achieve 27
per cent of its energy requirements from clean energy sources by 2021;

•

selection criteria in a procurement process, which specifies certain technical
requirements which may include reducing a developer's carbon footprint;

•

contractual obligations in project agreements for developers to comply with, including:
•

good industry practice

•

third party performance standards, such as IFC’s Performance Standards and
JBIC’s J-MRV Guidelines; and

•

project specific key performance indicators; and

•

the indirect effects of climate change, e.g. extreme weather conditions, may be
treated as a force majeure event under project agreements.

4.2 Recommendations relating to operational monitoring
In order to ensure that developers are actually proceeding with a project and acting in
accordance with a government-approved EIA, environmental licensing requirements, and best
practices, local regulatory authorities should frequently monitor the project and the status of
the developer’s compliance with its contractual, domestic, and international obligations over
the life-cycle of a project.
In practice, local regulatory authorities may face a number of challenges with this
recommendation, including, shortages of manpower, funding, training and technical expertise.
As a result, governments may wish to:
•

consider ring-fencing part of any revenues, fees or tariffs received by the government
from the development of the project, and apply such amounts to fund local regulatory
authorities such that they are able to effectively monitor the project and the developer’s
compliance with its obligations; and

•

seek training from third parties such as the World Bank, MLAs or technical advisers to
instruct regulatory authorities on good industry practices, identify unsafe work
practices, and consider ways in which environmental damage can be reduced, mitigated
and removed.

Where a project is financed, another practical safeguard is that project lenders will ensure that
designated technical advisers carry out continuous monitoring of the project during the term of
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the financing agreements. However, absent a contractual information-sharing agreement,
governments cannot be assured that they will be informed of nor have any control over this
monitoring.
4.3 Recommendations relating to post-disaster and enforcement
4.3.1

Extended scope of liability for enforcement actions

Countries should adopt new legislation or amend existing environmental legislation to ensure
that liability for certain acts or omissions of a developer that cause environment damage may
be attached to directors and officers of the developer. Such liability will ensure that, where
applicable, such individuals may be held personally liable for offences committed by the
developer. Such liability can provide an incentive for the directors and officers to take an active
and engaged role in ensuring that key steps are taken toward environmental compliance and
protection.
4.3.2

Financial penalties

Countries should adopt new legislation or amend existing environmental legislation to ensure
that financial penalties for breach of environmental laws are proportionate to the nature of the
damage and are appropriately scaled to ensure that such penalties act as a real deterrent to all
developers and do not crowd-out small developers or small projects (see Table 2 for details of
the financial penalties imposed by the Case Study Countries).
4.3.3

Environmental courts

In order to ensure that claims relating to environmental liabilities are efficiently and
appropriately addressed, countries should consider establishing specialized courts to determine
matters relating to environmental disputes.
5

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

5.1 Overview
Financial institutions increasingly play an important role in promoting sustainable development
and best practice and also in mitigating the risk of environmental disasters. Financial
institutions are involved in projects in various roles:
•

as lenders, financial institutions will expect to see an appropriate level of risk allocation
between the project company and the procuring government entity (including in relation
to environmental issues) and can act as powerful stakeholders, potentially influencing
some of the decisions taken by the management of the project company during the term
of the project;

•

as financial advisers to governments, financial institutions may assist in establishing an
international benchmark for procurement processes and ensuring environmental
compliance, even where the laws of the relevant country do not provide for such
safeguards; and
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•

as high-profile, often publicly listed corporate entities, financial institutions may be
incentivised by their large shareholder base to ensure that their investments and their
reputation are protected from the reputational and financial damage that occurs when
such entities are involved financially or otherwise in large-scale environmental
disasters.

5.2 Corporate versus project finance
The choice of financing structure by developers of a project has an important bearing on the
scope and influence that financial institutions may have on both a particular project and on the
borrower (which may differ depending on the lending structure, as detailed in Table 3 below).
Financing structures can broadly be divided into 'corporate finance' and 'project finance' and
the table below sets out the key features and differences between these structures.
Table 3: Corporate vs. Project Finance
Issue

Corporate finance

Project finance

Borrower

Creditworthy entity within the
developer's group, typically a
substantial holding or parent
company of the developer but
not the entity actually engaged
in the project.

SPV that has been created by
the developer for the purpose
of the project. The SPV’s
assets and liabilities will be
limited to the project’s assets
and liabilities and will not
extend to other entities within
the corporate group.

Tenor of debt

Shorter tenor. Typically less
than three years with a
revolving credit facility. Loan
documentation not necessarily
specific to project.

Longer
tenor.
Typically
equivalent to the term of the
project in order to line up
repayment of the loan with
project revenues.
Debt is
specific to project.

Leverage
(debt:equity
ratio)

No leverage. Developer needs
to
provide
return
to
shareholders from use of lines
of credit.

Highly leveraged. Developer
funding is limited to equity
with high proportion of lower
cost long-term debt.

Balance sheet On balance sheet. Ties up
treatment
corporate lines of credit and
may
constrain
further
borrowing as it adds to overall
leverage.

Potentially off-balance sheet
(depending on accounting
analysis). The only limit on
SPV's borrowing is the lenders'
willingness to lend.

Project
due Limited project-specific due Extensive project-specific due
diligence
diligence. Lenders look to the diligence,
including
full
creditworthiness
of
the contractual risk analysis and
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Table 3: Corporate vs. Project Finance
Issue

Security

Corporate finance

Project finance

borrower entity as a whole to
repay the loan, not to the
creditworthiness of the specific
project.

financial modelling. Lenders
need to be comfortable that the
revenues from the project can
meet the cost of debt service
(i.e. repayment of the principal
amount of the loan plus any
applicable interest).

Cross-guarantees
from No up- or cross-stream
downstream and upstream guarantees for debt service
group companies to meet debt obligations.
service obligations.

Covenants and Limited and/or generic projectundertakings
specific corporate covenants
and undertakings to be given by
borrower entity.

Events
default

Extensive
project-specific
covenants and undertakings to
be given by borrower entity
(e.g.
compliance
with
applicable laws, including
environmental laws).

of Events of default limited to Corporate events of default
corporate
defaults
(e.g. and project-specific events of
insolvency)
default, e.g. material breach of
project documents.

Corporate financings are typically used by large developers such as international oil and gas
companies, who will often look to fund new investments from the gross profits of the group
and will enter into very large revolving capital facilities with a group of lenders in order to give
them the financial flexibility to deploy funds within their corporate group where and as
necessary to projects undertaken by their subsidiary companies. Here, lenders are typically
relying on the creditworthiness of the corporate group as a whole and are less concerned with
the specific allocation of the capital within the group or to specific projects (within the
parameters established by the financing documents).
Project finance is used as a financing tool in a large number of sectors including the mining,
utilities (conventional and renewable power and wastewater), infrastructure (e.g. schools,
hospitals, ports, airports), oil and gas and transport industries, and are particularly used in cases
where projects are procured on the basis of an open tender. As can be seen from the summary
table above, lenders to a project finance transaction are lending based on the creditworthiness
of the project as opposed to the creditworthiness of the larger corporate family, and are thus
incentivised through the structure of their investment to ensure that project-specific risks,
including environmental risks, are appropriately addressed by the borrower, and that specific
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obligations and liabilities attach to the borrower in both the project documents and the related
finance documents in order to limit, as far as possible, any exposure that could impair the
borrower (an SPV) in its ability to repay the debt service.
As a result of the way a project finance transaction is structured from a legal perspective, the
interests of project finance lenders and the procuring government authority will be aligned in
a number of material respects for example:
•

creditworthiness of the developer(s) – both the project finance lenders and the
procuring governmental authority will need to be comfortable that the developer is able
to contribute sufficient equity to the project both at the start of the transaction and, if
necessary, throughout the term of the project to address any material issues which may
arise, e.g. to pay for any costs relating to an environmental liability; and

•

technical experience of the developer(s) – both the project finance lenders and the
procuring governmental authority will want to know that the developer(s) has a history
of being able to successfully execute projects to a standard that is consistent within the
relevant industry in order to avoid operational failures that may lead to environmental
disasters.

Typically, lenders will appoint a team of independent advisers (financial, technical and legal)
to advise them on specific matters related to a particular project. This advice will then need to
be taken into account by the developer and its advisers in its own commercial assessment of
the project. As such, the availability of project finance can be seen as adding an extra layer of
checks and balances both prior to the point of investment by the developer and during the lifecycle of the project.
5.3 Financial institutions
There are a number of different financial institutions that are involved in the project-finance
market and it is important to distinguish the role and different philosophies of each financial
institution in order to understand how a particular institution’s involvement may affect the
overall structuring of a project as well as the consideration given to environmental issues.
5.3.1

Commercial lenders

Commercial lenders are retail or investment banks that make debt financing available to
developers through debt or project finance facilities agreements, typically through a syndicate
of lenders. For projects in developing markets, the lender group may involve a combination of
international as well as local banks.
5.3.2

Export Credit Agencies

ECAs are public agencies and entities that provide government-backed loans, guarantees, and
insurance to corporations that are based the home country but seek to do business overseas as
foreign investors, typically in developing countries and emerging markets.
The main advantages for developers in obtaining loans from one or more ECAs are that:
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•

ECAs are generally able to offer lower interest rates than commercial lenders; and

•

ECAs may provide political risk insurance to protect against certain kinds of political
risks faced by developers when they invest in foreign markets (e.g. expropriation,
nationality-based discrimination).

The table below sets out some of the most well-known ECAs and their country of origin:
Country

Name of ECA

France

Compagnie Française d'Assurance pour le Commerce
Extérieur, COFACE

Germany

Euler Hermes Kreditversicherungs-AG

Italy

SACE SpA Servizi Assicurativi del Commercio Estero

Japan

Japan Bank for International Cooperation, JBIC
Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, NEXI

South Korea

The Export-Import Bank of Korea, K-EXIM

United States

Export-Import Bank of the United States, EXIM

Some ECAs have taken a proactive approach towards promoting sustainable development,
including environmental sustainability. For example, JBIC2 and NEXI3, which are widely
recognised as two of the most pro-active ECAs, have separately established and published
guidelines on environmental and social considerations, which are taken into account by their
respective credit committees when determining whether to fund a project. JBIC has also
published guidelines for the measurement, reporting and verification of greenhouse gas
emissions (the "J-MRV Guidelines"), which set out a number of best practice methodologies
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions across a number of different projects. To the extent
these guidelines are incorporated as covenants in the applicable contracts, a breach of the
applicable guidelines by a developer that is supported by JBIC or NEXI, as applicable, is
treated seriously by these institutions and may ultimately trigger an event of default under the
relevant finance documents.
5.3.3

Multilateral agencies

MLAs are international bodies that provide development aid or assistance, often to developing
countries. Well-known MLAs in the projects sector include: the International Finance
Corporation; the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Islamic
2

http://www.jbic.go.jp/en/efforts/environment/confirm (accessed on 22 February 2017).

3

http://nexi.go.jp/en/environment/social.html (accessed on 22 February 2017).
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Development Bank. MLAs often act as financiers for developers in jurisdictions in which it
may be otherwise difficult to obtain financing from commercial lenders (for various legal,
political, economic, or social reasons). In addition, MLAs also provide assistance to
government entities in the procurement of projects (including through viability gap funding
necessary for a project to achieve commercially viability and related commercial funding).
5.4 Case study: International Finance Corporation
The IFC is part of the World Bank Group and offers advisory, investment, and asset
management services to encourage private sector development in developing countries. The
IFC works closely with governments to:
•

provide structuring advice for PPP projects including in relation to public procurement
and risk allocation issues;

•

advise on new and/or effective laws and regulations; and

•

provide training and guidance to government employees.

One of the core aspects of IFC's advisory work is the implementation of its Sustainability
Framework, which codifies IFC's strategic commitment to sustainable development and forms
a core part of IFC's approach to risk management. The Sustainability Framework comprises
of a set of Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability4 ("Performance
Standards") and IFC's policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, which defines IFC's
commitments to environmental and social sustainability.
IFC Performance Standards
The Performance Standards are a set of standards for governments and governmental agencies
relating to issues of environmental and social sustainability, which aim to provide guidance on
how to identify and assess the impact of environmental risks with a view to avoiding, mitigating
and/or managing the effect of such risks on the host government.
In the case of IFC's direct financial investments, the IFC requires developers to apply the
Performance Standards to manage environmental and social risks and impacts relating to a
project so that development opportunities may be enhanced and compliant with IFC standards.
Where the IFC is acting as an adviser to governments, the Performance Standards are often
translated into contractual obligations on the developer under the applicable concession or
project documents.
In no small part due to IFC’s leverage as a stakeholder and its ability to ensure that the IFC
Performance Standards are incorporated into the legal documentation governing the financing
and operation of a project, the Performance Standards are significant in that they allow
governments to adopt an environmental regime, and one that reflects good industry practice,

4

http://www.ifc.org/performancestandards (accessed on 22 February 2017).
31

even where the legal regime of the host jurisdiction does not have a robust and/or specific set
of laws and regulations.
There are eight Performance Standards, however, for the purposes of this Report, Performance
Standards 1 and 3 are of particular interest and are considered in further detail below.
Performance Standard 1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social
Risks and Impacts
Performance standard 1 relates to:
• the carrying out of an integrated assessment to identify the environmental and
social impacts, risks and opportunities of projects;
• effective community engagement through disclosure of project-related
information and consultation with local communities on matters that directly
affect them; and
• management of environmental and social performance throughout the life of the
project.
For the purposes of ensuring Performance Standard 1 is enforced, the IFC encourages
the use of environmental and social management systems ("ESMS"). An ESMS is a
dynamic and continuous process initiated and supported by project management. It
involves engagement between governments, workers, project-affected communities
and, where appropriate, other stakeholders.
Performance Standard 1 identifies as objectives:
• to identify and evaluate environmental and social risks and impacts of the
project.
• to adopt a mitigation hierarchy to anticipate and avoid, or where avoidance is
not possible, minimize, and, where residual impacts remain, compensate/offset
for risks and impacts to workers, affected communities, and the environment.
• to promote improved environmental and social performance of clients through
the effective use of management systems.
• to ensure that grievances from affected communities and external
communications from other stakeholders are responded to and managed
appropriately.
• to promote and provide means for adequate engagement with affected
communities throughout the project cycle on issues that could potentially affect
them and to ensure that relevant environmental and social information is
disclosed and disseminated
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Performance Standard 3: Resource Efficiency and Pollution Prevention
Performance Standard 3 relates to reducing levels of pollution in the air, water and land
that may have adverse effects on the environment at the local, regional and global
levels, and identifies the following objectives:
• to avoid or minimise adverse impacts on human health and the environment by
avoiding or minimizing pollution from project activities;
• to promote more sustainable use of resources, including energy and water; and
• to reduce project-related greenhouse gas emissions.
6

CONCLUSION

This report has considered key phases of the investment process, pre-development, operational,
and enforcement, in which host governments can take proactive steps to prepare for any
potential environmental disaster caused by the project developer. Upon a comparative review
of the five Case Study Countries, various practices have been identified and discussed. The
authors found that the most critical issue impacting the ability of host governments to hold
developers responsible for environmental harm is a gap between applicable environmental
legislation and the enforcement of such environmental legislation. The authors provided
various recommendations (summarized in the Executive Summary) and emphasize the role that
planning and a robust legal and regulatory framework can have on decreasing the risk of
causing environmentally damaging events and minimizing the fallout from investment-related
environmental disasters.
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Annex 1
GLOSSARY AND DEFINITIONS
Unless defined below, capitalised terms in this Report have the meaning given in the relevant
document reported on in this Report.
"Abu Dhabi
Petroleum
Conservation
Law"

means Abu Dhabi Law No. 8 of 1978 on the preservation of petroleum
resources in Abu Dhabi.

"AED"

means UAE dirhams, the lawful currency of the UAE.

"Basel
Convention"

means the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989.

"CAD"

means Canadian dollars, the lawful currency of the Canada.

"Case Study
Countries"

means Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Uganda and the UAE, and "Case
Study Country" shall mean any one of them as the context so requires.

"CCSI"

means the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment.

"Convention to
Combat
Desertification"

means the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in
those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa, 1994.

"ECA"

means export credit agency.

"EIA"

means environmental impact assessment or environmental impact
study.

"ESMS"

has the meaning given in paragraph 0 of section 2 of this Report.

"IFC"

means International Finance Corporation.

"IMO"

means International Maritime Organisation.

"IMO Guidelines"

means the IMO Guidelines 1989.

"JBIC"

means Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

"J-MRV
Guidelines"

has the meaning given in paragraph Error! Reference source not
found. of section 2 of this Report.

"Kuwait
Convention"

means the Kuwait regional convention for co-operation on the
protection of the marine environment from pollution 1978 (and its
associated Protocols).
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"Kyoto Protocol"

means the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 1997.

"London
Convention"

means Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972.

"MLA"

means multilateral agencies.

"Montreal
Protocol"

means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, 1987.

"NEMA"

means the National Environmental Management Authority of
Uganda.

"NEXI"

means Nippon Export and Investment Insurance.

"OECD"

means Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

"OECD
Convection"

means the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1960.

"OSPAR
Convention"

means the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the North-East Atlantic 1992.

"Paris
Agreement"

means the Paris Agreement, 2015

"PEDP Act"

means the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act
No. 3 of 2013, Uganda, as defined in section 3.1 of this Report.

"Performance
Standards"

has the meaning given in paragraph 5.4 of section 2 of this Report.

"PPP"

means public-private partnership.

"Report"
"SPV"

means this report entitled Investment for Sustainable Development
Report.
means special purpose vehicle.

"UAE"

means the United Arab Emirates.

"UNCLOS"

means the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.

"UNFCCC"

means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, 1992.

"USD"

means United States dollars, the lawful currency of the United States
of America.
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SCHEDULE 1

KEY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS
The table below highlights only some of the key international environmental interests which relate to the subject of this Report. It is not an
exhaustive list. A comprehensive review of international environmental law is outside the scope of this Report.
Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

Vienna Convention for the The objectives of the Convention are for states to promote Entered into force: 22 September 1988
Protection of the Ozone cooperation on the ozone layer and to adopt legislative or
Layer, 1985
administrative measures against activities likely to have adverse Signatories: 28. Parties: 197
effects on the ozone layer. The Convention does not require states to
All Case Study Countries are a party:
take action to control ozone-depleting substances. The world agreed
the Montreal Protocol was subsequently agreed to advance that goal.
• Canada: ratified (4 Jun 1986)

Montreal Protocol

•

Chile: ratified (6 Mar 1990)

•

Indonesia: acceded (26 Jun 1992)

•

Uganda: acceded (24 Jun 1988)

•

UAE: acceded (22 Dec 1989)

The Montreal Protocol is a protocol to the Vienna Convention for the Entered into force: 1 Jan 1989
Protection of the Ozone Layer) is an international treaty designed to
protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of numerous Signatories: 46. Parties: 197
substances that are responsible for ozone depletion.
All Case Study Countries are a party:
Under the Montreal Protocol, developed countries, with an annual
consumption of more than 0.3kg per capita, are required to cease
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•

Canada: ratified (30 Jun 1988)

Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

production and phase-out consumption of CFCs from 1 January 1996
and 2030 for HCFCs. Developing countries, with an annual
consumption of less than 0.3kg per capita were granted a ten-year
grace period to comply with the phase-out targets in an orderly and
economical way (2010 for CFCs and 2040 for HCFCs).

Basel Convention

•

Chile: ratified (26 Mar 1990)

•

Indonesia: ratified (26 Jun 1992)

•

Uganda: ratified (15 Sep 1988)

•

UAE: acceded (22 Dec 1989)

Requires states to observe the fundamental principles of Entered into force: 5 May 1992
environmentally sound waste management. Under the Convention,
The movement of waste may only proceed if and when all states Signatories: 53. Parties: 186.
concerned have given their written consent.
All Case Study Countries are a party:
•

Canada: ratified (28 Aug 1992)

•

Chile: ratified (11 Aug 1992)

• Indonesia:
1993)

acceded

(20

•

Uganda: acceded (11 Mar 1999)

•

UAE: ratified (17 Nov 1992)

United
Nations The Convention aims to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations "at Entered into force: 21 Mar 1994
Framework Convention on a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human induced)
Signatories: 165. Parties: 197.
Climate
Change interference with the climate system."
(UNFCCC)
All Case Study Countries are a party:
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Sep

Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

Industrialised countries are expected to do the most to cut emissions
on home ground. They are known as Annex I countries.
The industrialised agree to support climate change activities in
developing countries (Non-Annex 1 countries) by providing financial
support for action on climate change, in addition to any financial
assistance they already provide to these countries. A system of grants
and loans has been set up through the Convention and is managed by
the Global Environment Facility.

•

Canada: ratified (19 Oct 1994)

•

Chile: ratified (22 Dec 1994)

•

Indonesia: ratified (23 Aug 1994)

•

Uganda: ratified (8 Sep 1993)

•

UAE: acceded (29 Dec 1995)

Industrialised countries also agree to share technology with lessadvanced nations
Convention to
Desertification

Combat The Convention provides a platform to combat desertification and Entered into force: 26 Dec 1996
mitigate the effects of drought through national action programmes
that incorporate long-term strategies supported by international Signatories: 114. Parties: 196
cooperation and partnership arrangements.
All Case Study Countries are a party:
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•

Canada: acceded (21 Dec 2016)

•

Chile: ratified (11 Nov 1997)

•

Indonesia: ratified (31 Aug 1998)

•

Uganda: ratified (25 Jun 1997)

•

UAE: acceded (21 Oct 1998)

Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

Kyoto Protocol

The Protocol commits its states parties by setting internationally Entered into force: 16 Feb 2005.
binding emission reduction targets. Under the Protocol, states must
meet their targets primarily through national measures. However, the Signatories: 83. Parties: 192
Protocol also provides that states may meet their targets by way of
All Case Study Countries are a party:
three market-based mechanisms: (i) international emissions trading;
(ii) the Clean Development Mechanism; and (iii) joint
• Canada: ratified (17 Feb 2002)
implementation.
• Chile: ratified (26 Aug 2002)
Given that developed countries are principally responsible for the
current high levels of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere,
• Indonesia: ratified (3 Dec 2004)
the Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations under the
• Uganda: acceded (25 Mar 2002)
principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities".
•

Paris Agreement

UAE: acceded (26 Jan 2005)

The Paris Agreement aims to accelerate and intensify the actions and Entered into force: 4 Nov 2016
investment needed for a sustainable low carbon future and to
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change by Signatories: 194. Parties: 133
keeping a global temperature rise below 2°C above pre-industrial
All Case Study Countries are a party:
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even
further to 1.5 2°C. The Paris Agreement also aims to strengthen the
• Canada: ratified (5 Oct 2016)
ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change.
• Chile: ratified (10 Feb 2017)
The Paris Agreement establishes a framework to put in place by 2025
financing and an enhanced capacity building framework to support
• Indonesia: ratified (31 Oct 2016)
action by developing countries and the most vulnerable countries, in
• Uganda: ratified (21 Sep 2016)
line with their own national objectives.
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Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

The Paris Agreement requires all states parties to put forward their
best efforts through 'nationally determined contributions' (NDCs) and
to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead. This includes
requirements that all states parties report regularly on their emissions
and on their implementation efforts.
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•

UAE: acceded (21 Sep 2016)

SCHEDULE 2

OFFSHORE DECOMMISSIONING – INTERNATIONAL REGIME
The principal international legal instruments and guidelines are set out below.
Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

Geneva Convention on the The Convention requires the complete removal of oil and gas Entered into force: 10 June 1964
Continental Shelf, 1958
structures which have been abandoned or are no longer being used.
Signatories: 43. Parties: 58
Article 5(1) provides that the exploration of the continental shelf and
the exploitation of its natural resources must not result in any Of the Case Study Countries, only Canada
unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation and Uganda are a party:
of the resources of the sea.
• Canada: ratified (6 Feb 1970)
Article 5(2) provides that the coastal state is entitled to construct and
maintain or operate on the continental shelf installations and other
devices necessary for its exploration and the exploitation of its natural
resources.
Article 5(5) provides that any installations which are to be abandoned
or disused must be entirely removed.

• Chile: signed, not ratified (31 Oct
1958)*
• Indonesia: signed, not ratified (8
May 1958)*
•

Uganda: acceded (14 Sep 1964)

•

UAE: n/a*

* There is low possibility that article 5(5)
may be customary international law.
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Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment
The Convention is the starting point for the
development of international law regarding
offshore decommissioning.

Kuwait Convention and Article XIII of the Kuwait Protocol provides that each Contracting
Kuwait Protocol
State must ensure that the Competent Authority has the power to
require the operator of an offshore installation in the case of platforms
and other sea-bed apparatus and structures, to remove the installation
in whole or in part to ensure the safety of navigation and the interests
of fishing. Each Contracting State must also take all practicable
measures to ensure that the operator has sufficient resources to
guarantee that any such requirements can be met.

The Kuwait Convention entered into force on
1 July 1979 and the Kuwait Protocol entered
into force on 17 February 1990.

Contracting States must pass, and take all practicable steps to enforce,
measures to ensure that no offshore installation which in use has
floated at or near the sea-surface, and no equipment from an offshore
installation, will be deposited on the seabed of the continental shelf
when it is no longer needed.

- the Kuwait Convention was signed on 24
April 1978 and ratified on 1 December 1979;
and

According to the UN Environment
Programme database, the UAE has both
signed and ratified the Kuwait Convention
and the Kuwait Protocol:

- the Kuwait Protocol was signed on 29
March 1989 and ratified on 17 April 1990.
The Kuwait Convention and Kuwait Protocol
are regional instruments limited to the six
Gulf Cooperation Council states (including
the UAE), Iran and Iraq.

UNCLOS

Article 60(3) provides: Any installations or structures which are Entered into force on 16 Nov 1994.
abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure safety of
navigation, taking into account any generally accepted international Signatories: 157. Parties: 168.
standards established in this regard by the competent international
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Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

organisation. Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the The UAE is not a party.
protection of the marine environment and the rights and duties of
• Canada: ratified (7 Nov 2003)
other states. Appropriate publicity shall be given to the depth,
position and dimensions of any installations or structures not entirely
• Chile: ratified (25 Aug 1997)
removed.
Article 210 requires states to adopt rules to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment by dumping; to establish
global and regional rules and procedures to prevent, reduce and
control such pollution; and to adopt national laws no less effective
than the global rules and standards.

•

Indonesia: ratified (3 Feb 1986)

•

Uganda: ratified (9 Nov 1990)

• UAE: signed not ratified (10 Dec
1982)*

National laws, regulations and measures must be no less effective in * It is generally accepted that a number of
preventing, reducing and controlling such pollution than the global provisions of UNCLOS, including its articles
rules and standards.
on navigation rights and high seas freedoms,
reflect customary international law, namely
Dumping is defined to include "any deliberate disposal of vessels,
are binding whether or not a state is a party to
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea".
UNCLOS.
The competent international organisation is
the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO), which in 1989, pursuant to a
resolution of the IMO, issued Guidelines and
Standards for the Removal of Offshore
Installations and Structures on the
Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive
Economic Zone.
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Instrument

Key requirements

IMO Guidelines

Installations in water depth of less than 75m (100 meters after 1 The IMO Convention entered into force on
January 1998) and weighing less than 4,000 tonnes should be 17 March 1958.
removed completely, subject to the qualifications below.
All Case Study Countries are members of the
If installations are partially removed, an unobstructed water column IMO.
of not less than 55m should be left above the installations remaining.
The IMO Guidelines are however not
Notwithstanding the above, total removal will not be required if it is binding. The standards set out in article 60(3)
either not technically feasible; or involves extreme cost; or would of UNCLOS were issued in 1989 by the IMO,
constitute unacceptable risk to personnel or the marine environment. in the form of guidelines and standards.
These guidelines do not constitute legal
All installations after 1 January 1998 are to be designed and built so requirements, but are simply recommended
that their entire removal is feasible.
for consideration by IMO Member States in
their decision-making on decommissioning.

London Convention

The London Convention

1996 Protocol to the
convention
on
the
prevention of marine
pollution by dumping of
wastes and other matter
(the Protocol)

Status/comment

According to the IMO5, Canada and Chile are
a party to the Protocol, the UAE is a party to
The London Convention requires that Contracting Parties issue a the London Convention. Indonesia and
permit for the dumping of waste and other matter at sea and generally Uganda are not a party to either instrument.
prohibits the dumping of certain hazardous materials. "Dumping"
includes any deliberate disposal at sea of vessels, aircraft, platforms
or other manmade structures at sea.
The Protocol

5

http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Environment/LCLP/Documents/Parties%20to%20the%20London%20Convention%20and%20Protocol%20
Dec%202016.pdf
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Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

The Protocol supersedes the original London Convention as between
contracting parties that are parties to both the London Convention and
the Protocol.
The changes relating to the decommissioning of offshore platforms
are:
- the definition of dumping was extended to include "any
abandonment or toppling at site of platforms, or other man-made
structure, at sea, for the sole purpose of deliberate disposal";
- the Protocol prohibits the dumping of any waste or other matter
except for those listed in Annex 1, and those matters listed in Annex
1 require a permit. In Annex 1, platforms, or other man-made
structures at sea, are included, provided: materials capable of creating
floating debris or pollution have been removed; dumping poses no
serious obstacle to fishing and navigation; and materials containing
levels of radioactivity exceeding exempted concentrations are not
eligible for dumping.
OSPAR Convention

The OSPAR Convention is intended to complement the existing The OSPAR Convention relates to the North
international treaties.
East Atlantic only. However, it provides an
example of international practice, albeit
The OSPAR Decision 98/3 on the Disposal of Disused Offshore limited to the North East Atlantic.
Installations provides that the dumping, and the leaving wholly or
partly in place, of disused offshore installations within the maritime
area is prohibited (paragraph 2), subject to possible derogations
where the competent authority of the relevant Contracting Party is
satisfied that an assessment shows that there are significant reasons
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Instrument

Key requirements

Status/comment

why an alternative (specified) disposal method is preferable to reuse
or recycling or final disposal on land.
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